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Abstract
There is growing interest in avian influenza (AI) epidemiology to predict disease risk in wild and domestic birds, and prevent
transmission to humans. However, understanding the epidemic dynamics of highly pathogenic (HPAI) viruses remains
challenging because they have rarely been detected in wild birds. We used modeling to integrate available scientific
information from laboratory and field studies, evaluate AI dynamics in individual hosts and waterfowl populations, and
identify key areas for future research. We developed a Susceptible-Exposed-Infectious-Recovered (SEIR) model and used
published laboratory challenge studies to estimate epidemiological parameters (rate of infection, latency period, recovery
and mortality rates), considering the importance of age classes, and virus pathogenicity. Infectious contact leads to infection
and virus shedding within 1–2 days, followed by relatively slower period for recovery or mortality. We found a shorter
infectious period for HPAI than low pathogenic (LP) AI, which may explain that HPAI has been much harder to detect than
LPAI during surveillance programs. Our model predicted a rapid LPAI epidemic curve, with a median duration of infection of
50–60 days and no fatalities. In contrast, HPAI dynamics had lower prevalence and higher mortality, especially in young
birds. Based on field data from LPAI studies, our model suggests to increase surveillance for HPAI in post-breeding areas,
because the presence of immunologically naı ¨ve young birds is predicted to cause higher HPAI prevalence and bird losses
during this season. Our results indicate a better understanding of the transmission, infection, and immunity-related
processes is required to refine predictions of AI risk and spread, improve surveillance for HPAI in wild birds, and develop
disease control strategies to reduce potential transmission to domestic birds and/or humans.
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Introduction
Avian influenza (AI) became a significant human and domestic
animal health issue in 1996 when highly pathogenic (HP) H5N1
virus was isolated from domestic geese in southern China. Since
2002, HPAI H5N1 strains have emerged in both wild and
domestic birds and spread throughout the Old World [1–2].
Concern for interspecies transmission and adaptation of AI viruses
to mammalian hosts has renewed interest in the epidemiology of
AI in wild and domestic birds to predict disease risk and spread,
and prevent further transmission to human and domestic
populations.
Historically, HPAI viruses in domestic poultry, and subsequent-
ly humans, likely arose by the introduction and mutation of low
pathogenic (LP) AI strains from wild birds. Extensive field surveys
reported the continuous worldwide circulation of LPAI in wild
birds, primarily Anseriformes and Charadriiformes, which are
considered the natural reservoir of all 16 HA and 9 NA subtypes of
influenza A viruses [3–5]. Prevalence and distribution of LPAI
virus subtypes markedly differ among species, years, and places.
Within bird migratory flyways, a seasonal decline in LPAI
prevalence has been typical, with higher prevalence in naı ¨ve
young birds [6–9]. The components underlying spatial and
temporal heterogeneity in AI prevalence are still unclear.
Epidemic dynamics may be influenced by ecological factors that
influence habitat use by waterfowl species, species differences in
susceptibility, age- and species-related differences in virus
shedding, environmental conditions that influence virus persis-
tence in wetlands [10], and immunity (or cross-immunity) from a
previous exposure to influenza viruses [11].
There is currently little scientific information about the basic
epidemiology of AI in wild and domestic birds, the role of the
environment as a reservoir for AI, the mechanisms underlying AI
immunity, and the potential role of wild birds as carriers of HPAI
viruses. The impact of HPAI in wild birds is species-specific and
some migrating species shed large amounts of virus without
exhibiting clinical disease [12–17], suggesting that they could serve
as long-distance carriers. Assessing the temporal and spatial
dynamics of AI viruses, the potential impact of HPAI on wild
birds, and the risk of HPAI transmission and spread by migratory
birds is challenging because HPAI research is restricted to high
security laboratories and natural epidemics are rare; typically
discovered after epidemiological dynamics have occurred and/or
affected wild birds have migrated.
Understanding AI dynamics in wild bird populations can be
facilitated by using models that evaluate and integrate diverse
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models of disease systems can help to assess the potential
effectiveness of alternative management strategies [18], identify
critical gapsinourknowledge, and determinerelative importanceof
different parts of the system [19]. We developed an epidemiological
SEIR model (Susceptible, Exposed, Infected, Recovered) that
describes the dynamics of AI infection in individual birds. AI
viruses are transmitted by bird-to-bird contact or through the
environment.Afterinfectiouscontact,asusceptible(S)bird becomes
exposed (E) or infected. During the latent period, AI virus develops
within the host until the host becomes infectious (I) by shedding
virus. LPAI viruses replicate preferentially in the gastrointestinal
tract and are excreted at high levels in the feces. In contrast recent
HPAI viruses, and in particular H5N1 viruses isolated since 2002,
replicate primarily in the upper respiratory tract of wild ducks [15].
Ultimately, the host will recover (R) or die (D) depending on the
interaction between its immune system and the virus.
Parameters for the SEIR model, including rate of infection, latent
period, recovery and mortality rates are estimated from analyses of
published laboratory infection trials for different Anseriform species
and AI viruses. In our assessment, we evaluate age-related
differences in disease parameters to compare AI dynamics in post-
breeding populations composed of hatch-year (,1.5 months) and
adult birds, and wintering populations (adult birds only). We also
consider the effect of virus pathogenicity on epidemiological
parameters. We extended this model to wild bird populations by
estimating the rate of infectious contact with virus (bird-to-bird or
environmental contact) using prevalence data from waterfowl
surveys. We use the SEIR model to evaluate the sensitivity of
parameter estimates on dynamics during AI outbreaks, compare
LPAI and HPAI outbreak predictions to field observations, and
consider the potential for bird mortality and disease spread
depending on the age-composition of the population.
Results
SEIR transition rates and times
Exponential rates of transition from susceptible (d) or exposed
(s) to the infectious state were estimated from published
laboratory challenge data (Table 1; see Figure S1 for exponential
curve fit to the data). Susceptible birds exposed by contact to
LPAI-inoculated birds became infectious at a slower rate (median
time =1.50 days) compared with HPAI-inoculated birds (0.76
day). LPAI-inoculated birds also have a longer latent period (1.21
days) than HPAI-inoculated birds (0.28 day). Subtracting the
latent time (i.e. ERI) from the time for susceptible individuals to
become infectious (SRI), we estimated the median time required
for susceptible birds to become exposed/infected (SRE), which
was slightly longer for HP than LP viruses (0.48 vs. 0.28 day,
respectively). We believe calculating SRE as a difference between
other parameters combined with the scarcity of LPAI data
produced an imprecise estimate for the LPAI infection rate, with a
large SD. In HPAI laboratory challenges, the median time to
become infectious was longer in young than adult birds for both
contact (0.91 vs. 0.23 day, respectively) and inoculated birds (0.62
vs. 0.28 day, respectively). Similarly, in LPAI experiments, it took
longer for susceptible young birds to become infectious compared
to adults (1.83 vs. 0.89 days, respectively). Low sample size
prevented the estimation of infection rates for young and adults
with LPAI and for adults with HPAI. Overall, the infection process
(SRI) was rapid, about a day with HPAI and two days for LPAI
because of a longer latent period (ERI).
All birds recovered from LPAI infection, so the mortality rate
was nil in LPAI-infected birds. Among parametric survival models,
the loglogistic model provided the best fit (lowest AIC) to the
HPAI time to mortality data (Table S1 and Figure S2). The
median time to death was significantly shorter (P,0.001) in young
Table 1. Estimated transition rates and median time periods between epidemiological states for AI in waterfowl.
HP LP
Parameter Adult Young Both ages Adult Young Both ages
d (SRI) rate6SD 2.9861.98 0.7660.07 0.9260.10 0.7860.41 0.3860.15 0.4660.11
median time (day) 0.23 0.91 0.76 0.89 1.83 1.50
n=6 n=69 n=75 n=3 n=3 n=6
s (ERI) rate6SD 2.4760.40 1.1260.15 2.4760.37 0.5460.13 { 0.5760.13
median time (day) 0.28 0.62 0.28 1.28 1.21
n=28 n=78 n=106 n=7 n=1 n=8
t
(1) (SRE) rate6SD n/a 2.3960.99 1.4660.29 n/a n/a 2.4463.96
median time (day) 0.29 0.48 0.28
c (IRR) scale6SD 4.6261.17 5.3261.07 9.8161.30 11.2861.19
shape 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.46
median time (day) 4.62 5.32 9.81 11.28
n=23 n=96 n=8 n=5
d (IRD) scale6SD 17.9061.29 5.1661.09 n/a n/a
shape 2.26 2.26
median time (day) 17.90 5.16
n=23 n=96
Rates estimated from published laboratory challenge trials, see methods for details.
n, number of laboratory challenges; n/a, not applicable; {, non-convergence of the model.
(1)By subtracting the latent period (1/s) from the period for susceptible birds to become infectious (1/d), we estimated the time for susceptible to become exposed (1/t)
and the infection rate t.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010997.t001
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the best model for the time to recovery data (Table S1 and Figure
S2). The median recovery period was markedly shorter in HPAI-
than LPAI-infected birds (P,0.001). Recovery tended to be
shorter in adult birds than young (P=0.13, Table 1); however,
there was substantial overlap in the estimated confidence intervals
between adults and young for both HPAI and LPAI. For infectious
individuals, mortality and recovery are competing outcomes which
simultaneously influence the length of the infectious period.
Although median recovery times from HPAI are similar between
young and adult waterfowl (4.62 vs. 5.32 days), the median
mortality period was four times longer in adults than young (17.90
vs. 5.16 days). As a result, the median infectious period is slightly
longer in adult (4 days) than young HPAI-infected birds (3 days),
and more fatalities are expected in young than adult birds.
Moreover, the longer recovery period for LPAI results in a longer
median infectious and shedding period (about 10 days) than for
HPAI (3.5 days).
Sensitivity and AI dynamics
Sensitivity analysis using Latin hypercube sampling indicated
that peak prevalence (maximum proportion of infectious birds) was
most sensitive to the rate of infectious contact h and rate of
infection t (Table S2). Higher infectious contact or infection rates
produced more rapid epidemics with higher peak prevalence.
However, the amount of population mortality caused during AI
epidemics was most sensitive to recovery and mortality rates.
Lower recovery rates or higher mortality rates for individual birds
produced an increase of the number of dead birds.
We investigated LPAI and HPAI dynamics in post-breeding and
wintering waterfowl populations, using mean estimates for epide-
miological parameters (Table 1). Because recovery and mortality
rates from the loglogistic model depend on the time since infection,
we implemented our model using 30 daily sub-stages of the
infectious period, each with a corresponding loglogistic hazard rate,
to estimate rates of recovery (or mortality) at each day since
infection. LPAI prevalence predicted by the model was similar to
field prevalence estimates reported in young wild ducks (15–61%)
for h values ranging from 0.01 to 0.08 (Figure 1A). In our model, h
represents the daily probability that any susceptible wild bird in the
populationwill have an infectiouscontact. Peak prevalencewhen all
birds were exposed on day one (h=1) reached 85%. We used a
mean rate of infectious contact of 0.04 to further investigate disease
dynamics in waterfowl populations. Our model predicted rapid
LPAI epidemic curves with peak prevalence of about 45% 13 days
after the initial infection (Figure 1B). There was no difference in
Figure 1. Predicted prevalence and disease dynamics in wild birds. A: LPAI peak prevalence for hatch-year waterfowl and estimated rate of
infectious contact h; h values between 0.01 and 0.08 corresponded with LPAI prevalence observed in young waterfowl at post-breeding areas (15–
61%, delimited by dotted lines). B and C: Predicted dynamics during LPAI and HPAI outbreaks, respectively, for Susceptible (blue), Exposed (green),
Infectious (black), Recovered (red), and Dead (purple) birds in post-breeding (dashed lines) and wintering populations (solid lines). Graphs basedo n
mean epidemiological parameters (Table 1) and an infectious contact rate (h) of 0.04. D. Comparison of prevalence dynamics during LPAI (red) and
HPAI (black) epidemics in post-breeding (dashed lines) and wintering populations (solid lines).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010997.g001
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information on age-specific infection rates (t and s; Table 1). The
median duration of a LPAI epizootic was about 50–60 days with no
fatalities. HPAI dynamics, in contrast to LPAI, were characterized
by a shorter epidemic curve, lower peak prevalence, and high bird
losses particularly in the post-breeding population (Figure 1C). The
post-breeding population had peak prevalence of 20% at day 7 and
30% of individuals were dead 60 days after the onset of the HPAI
outbreak. In the wintering population, HPAI prevalence reached
19% at day 8 but the proportion of susceptible birds that died
during the epidemic was lower (about 9%) than at post-breeding
areas (Figure 1D). The median duration of HPAI epizootics was
about 40–50 days.
Discussion
Based on a comprehensive analysis of published data on HPAI
and LPAI for waterfowl, we estimated transition rates between
disease states including the rates of infection, disease progression
within the host (latent period), host mortality and recovery. We
implemented disease transition rates using an epidemiological
model that provides the foundation for understanding and
predicting the dynamics of AI outbreaks in bird populations. In
individual birds, contact with AI-infectious birds and/or a
contaminated environment leads to rapid progression of infection
and virus shedding within 1–2 days, followed by relatively slower
periodsofrecoveryormortality.Wefoundahighermortalityratein
young than adult HPAI-infected waterfowl, but similar recovery
rates. Age-related difference in the outcome of infection has
previously been observed in ducks infected with AI [20–21] or other
viruses [22]. Hypothesized mechanisms for age-related differences
include maturation of the immune system or links between host cell
maturation and the capacity for virus replication [22].
To predict disease dynamics in wild birds, we approximated the
rate of infectious contact h from LPAI prevalence data in wild
populations of young (naı ¨ve) ducks. Our model facilitates a
comparison of AI dynamics and showed substantial differences in
the dynamics of LPAI and HPAI infections, with shorter HPAI
epidemics, lower prevalence of infectious birds, and higher
mortality than LPAI epidemics. Because we used similar rates of
infectious contact h, the non-mortality differences likely reflect a
longer latent period (ERI) and longer recovery period (IRR) for
LPAI (Table 1). Although we assumed infectious contact rates
were constant over time and similar in both LP and HPAI
outbreaks, the rate of infectious contact likely depends on the
relative importance of bird-to-bird and environmental transmis-
sion, number of infected birds, abundance of virus in wetlands,
and inherent characteristics of the host and virus. LPAI viruses
multiply primarily within the digestive tract, are shed into the
environment where they persist for an extended period of time
[10], and become a critical reservoir for sustaining LPAI virus in
waterfowl populations [23]. In contrast, HPAI viruses are shed via
both oral and cloacal routes (due to replication in the respiratory
and digestive tracts), but have rarely been isolated from the
environment [24]. Consequently, the role of environmental
transmission in HPAI epidemics remains unknown. Although we
found a longer recovery period (longer infectious period) for LPAI
than HPAI, we speculate that oral and cloacal shedding of HPAI
viruses may help increase transmission in spite of the relatively
short infectious period. Given the significant effect of h on
epidemic dynamics (Table S2), determining the relative impor-
tance of alternative transmission routes, rates of infectious
contacts, and factors that influence contact rates will enhance
our understanding of AI dynamics in wild bird populations.
We found few differences in predicted epidemic dynamics based
on time of year (i.e. mix of adult and young waterfowl in the
population; Fig. 1B and C). Although the lack of age-specific
challenge trails for LPAI prevents a reliable evaluation of seasonal
differences in susceptibility to AI viruses, we found age-related
differences in disease processes for HPAI, indicating faster disease
progression (SRI and ERI) in adult than young birds. Our
sensitivity analysis also demonstrated that the rate of infection
(SRE) plays a key role in AI epidemic dynamics. We acknowledge
that uncertainty in LPAI infection rate may have affected our
sensitivity analysis; however, we found infection rate was also a key
parameter affecting peak prevalence in HPAI dynamics (Table
S2). Additional laboratory challenges clarifying age-related
differences in the LPAI infection processes, the source of virus
exposure (by fecal/oral transmission or environmental transmis-
sion), and the level of exposure (with dose-response experiments)
would expand our understanding of infection rates under various
conditions.
Because little is known about AI immunity in wild birds our
model assumed the entire population is susceptible to infection,
and that recovery confers immunity for the duration of an
epidemic (.50–60 days). It has been observed that Pekin ducks
(Anas platyrhinchos) have sufficient immunity to clear a secondary
LPAI-infection without shedding virus for at least 12 weeks after
initial infection with the same LPAI subtype [11]. It has also been
demonstrated that birds with preexisting LPAI antibodies have a
lower probability of developing HPAI infection, but may shed HP
virus [16,25–28]. The predicted effect of immunity (or cross-
immunity) is a decline in the proportion of susceptible birds and an
increase in the proportion of recovered and resistant birds as LPAI
viruses spread in the population during fall migration. However,
the length of these effects also depends on the length of immunity
(e.g. 3 months vs. one year) and extent of cross-immunity among
AI viruses. The consequence is a decline in epidemic curve by
decreasing the proportion of infectious birds (Figure 1A). A similar
conclusion was illustrated in a previous simulation model of annual
LPAI dynamics in dabbling ducks [29]. An improved understand-
ing of the processes underlying immunity and cross-immunity
among LP and HPAI viruses is important in assessing the
susceptibility of wild bird populations to HPAI viruses, predicting
when epidemics are likely to occur, and developing effective
surveillance programs for HPAI.
Extensive surveillance programs for AI viruses have reported
the presence of LPAI asymptomatic carrier birds all around the
world (at various levels of prevalence depending on season, bird
species, and virus strain). On the other hand, HPAI viruses have
been detected in only a few healthy wild birds [30], and in most
HPAI outbreaks, only a few dead individuals have been found. In
a general sense, these observations agree with our model
predictions of short epidemics for HPAI and much higher
prevalence and longer duration of infection in birds with LPAI.
Using the infectious contact rate for LPAI to predict HPAI
dynamics, our model predicts a low epidemic curve on wintering
areas, with negligible or scattered mortalities, which will likely be
difficult to detect. In addition, we suspect that HPAI outbreaks
may be even less conspicuous on wintering grounds because a
large proportion of waterfowl would likely have immunity from
previous LPAI infections. In contrast, our model predicts a higher
HPAI prevalence (and mortality) in post-breeding areas. Because
surveillance programs have primarily relied on swabs to detect AI
in wild birds (e.g. [8,31–32]), it is not surprising that HPAI, with a
shorter length of infection than LPAI, has been much harder to
detect. Our results suggest that serological surveys to determine
circulation of AI viruses in avian populations [33] may be much
Avian Influenza Epidemiology
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longer than infection. Overall, our model suggests intensifying AI
surveillance in post-breeding areas, which have a large number of
immunologically naı ¨ve birds, to increase the probability of
detecting HP viruses, given the expected higher prevalence and
fatalities in these areas.
Methods
Epidemiological model
We mathematically modeled AI dynamics for a closed biological
system with no changes in bird demographics (no immigration,
emigration, or natural mortality), where all of the initial
population is susceptible, and birds that recover have long-term
(. length of the epidemic curve) immunity. We used ordinary
differential equations to model changes in the number of birds in
each SEIR state with time t:
dS
dt
~{lS
dE
dt
~lS{sE
dI
dt
~sE{cI{dI
dR
dt
~cI
dD
dt
~dI
where l is the force of infection, s is the rate that latent birds
become infectious, c is the recovery rate (i.e. the instantaneous
probability of recovering, conditional on survival to that time), and
d is the disease-related mortality rate. The force of infection l, the
rate at which susceptible birds transition to the infected state (E), is
the product of the rate of infectious contact h (by bird-to-bird
contact and environmental route) and the rate t at which
susceptible birds that contact virus become infected (E). We
implemented the model using a daily time step (t=1 day).
Laboratory challenge trials
AI laboratory challenge data published over the three last
decades were used to estimate model parameters [11,13–
17,21,25,34–46]. We analyzed experiments where birds were
‘‘naturally’’ inoculated (i.e. via the nares or throat) and excluded
data from intramuscular and intravenous challenges. We consid-
ered inoculated birds as exposed (latent) individuals, assuming that
virus inoculation represented infectious exposure. In some
experiments, susceptible birds were housed in direct contact with
inoculated birds. We considered birds to be infectious when they
began shedding virus (detected by virus isolation in oral or cloacal
samples). Recovered birds were individuals which no longer shed
virus. We only considered experiments where the course of the
disease (i.e. disease state) was measured at least once within four
days post-challenge.
We evaluated disease dynamics in waterfowl (i.e. Anseriformes)
infected with viruses isolated from birds or humans. We
considered two age classes, ,1.5 month (young) and $1.5 month
(adult), to evaluate age-related differences in disease parameters
and to compare AI dynamics in post-breeding and wintering
populations. We also considered viruses as HP or LP, based on
their ability to cause disease in chickens [47].
SEIR transition rates
We estimated the rate s at which exposed birds become
infectious from the cumulative proportion of infectious birds
through time (number of infectious birds/number of birds in the
experiment) from challenge trials with inoculated birds. Similarly,
we estimated the rate d at which susceptible birds become
infectious from challenge trials where susceptible birds had contact
with infected birds. We estimated s and d using nonlinear mixed-
effects models in R 2.1.1 [48–49] assuming a constant transition
rate, which produces an exponential distribution of the proportion
infected:
ft ,rate ðÞ ~1{e{rate t,
where rate denotes the transition rates s or d. From laboratory
studies we found $97% of the contact birds become infected. We
estimated the period for susceptible birds to become exposed
(transition rate t) by subtracting the latent period (transition E to I)
from the period for susceptible birds to become infectious (S to I).
Because recovery and death are competiting events, we used
survival analyses to estimate recovery c and disease-related
mortality d rates for infectious birds. The time to recovery or
mortality was right-censored when the individual was still
infectious at the end of the experiment or was removed (in an
infectious state) before the end of the experiment. We evaluated
several parametric hazard models including the Exponential,
Gaussian, Logistic, Loglogistic, and Weibull [50] using Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC [51]). Goodness-of-fit for the selected
model was assessed using the Grønnesby and Borgan [52] test,
which compares the number of observed events with those
expected from the model, within four risk-score groups for the
recovery data (206 events) and two risk-score groups for the
mortality data (72 events). We incorporated covariates in the
hazard rate using the model scale parameter:
scale~exp n0zn1x1z:::znnxn ðÞ ,
with n0 the coefficient of the intercept, and nn the coefficient of the
covariate xn [53].
AI dynamics and sensitivity
We tested the potential importance of epidemiological param-
eters on model predictions using Latin Hypercube Sampling [54].
This stratified Monte Carlo sampling procedure identifies the key
parameters which affect model outputs. In this method, the
assumed probability distribution of each model parameter is
divided into N equal probability intervals and one random value is
selected from each interval. The N values obtained for each
parameter are paired randomly with the N values from all other
parameters. In our sensitivity analysis, we used N=30, a uniform
distribution U(0,1) for the rate of infectious contact h, and
Gaussian distributions N(mean, SD
2) for the infection rate t, the
transition rate s, and scale parameters of the recovery rate c, and
disease mortality rate d. Mean parameter estimates and SD are
given in Table 1. Given the large SD for the LPAI infection rate,
we used a uniform distribution U(0, 10) for this parameter. We
quantified parameter sensitivity on model predictions for the
number of infectious birds at peak prevalence (peak of the
epidemic curve) and cumulative number of dead birds during the
Avian Influenza Epidemiology
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tion coefficient, SPC, which measures the linear correlation
between a model parameter and output, corrected for other
correlated parameters [55]. Sensitivity was based on 100 model
runs for 60 days.
In laboratory challenges, susceptible (contact) birds were
exposed to AI virus by close contact with infectious individuals
and a contaminated environment. Therefore, the rate of infectious
contact h is assumed to be 1. To model AI dynamics in wild bird
populations with a realistic h value, we estimated the range of h
which predicts LPAI prevalence reported in young wild ducks (all
assumed susceptible) at post breeding areas (15–61% [56–59]). We
assumed that field estimates correspond to peak prevalence. We
used the mean value for h in our model to investigate LPAI and
HPAI dynamics in waterfowl populations of 10000 birds,
composed of 50% adult and 50% young birds (approximate
post-breeding population composition; [60 p. 230]) or of adult
birds only (wintering population). Scarcity of challenge trials
prevented us from estimating age-related infection rates (LPAI and
HPAI) and latent period (LPAI); therefore, we used mean
estimates from both age classes (Table 1) in model projections
and sensitivity analyses.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Estimated LP and HPAI infection rates. Proportion of
young (black) and adult (grey) birds which become infectious by
exposure to infected birds or a contaminated environment (top), or
after inoculation with AI (bottom). Lines represent exponential
curves for mean infection rates provided in Table 1. Marker size is
proportional to the number of experimental challenges (1 to 70).
Note different time scales among graphs.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010997.s001 (0.23 MB TIF)
Figure S2 Cumulative recovery and mortality probabilities after
infection. Lines with markers are cumulative probabilities of young
(black) and adult (grey) birds from laboratory challenges.
Corresponding lines without markers are the predicted cumulative
probabilities for the loglogistic model based on mean recovery and
mortality rates provided in Table 1.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010997.s002 (5.76 MB TIF)
Table S1 Comparison of alternative parametric models for time
to recovery and time to death. Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)
values and number of model parameters (K) for alternative models
of time to recovery and time to death from LP and HPAI
laboratory challenge trials. Recovery data was modeled using an
additive effect of age and virus pathogenicity (LP vs. HP). Time to
death models only included HPAI-infected birds because LPAI
infection did not cause mortality; these models also included the
effect of age.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010997.s003 (0.04 MB
DOC)
Table S2 Sensitivity of epidemiological parameters for peak
prevalence and proportion of the population dying from AI. The
model describes disease dynamics in a population of 10000
individuals during 60 days. We used Latin Hypercube Sampling
(N=30, 100 runs) and a semi partial correlation coefficient (SPC)
to measure the relative influence of model parameters. See text for
additional information.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010997.s004 (0.09 MB
DOC)
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